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Organizing Against Independence:
The 1995 Federal Strategy during the Quebec
Referendum Campaign
JUAN ANTONIO MORALES, BRIDGEWATER STATE UNIVERSITY, BRIDGEWATER, MA, USA.
j1morales@student.bridgew.edu
Abstract: In 1995, Canada came the closest it has ever been in its history to breaking apart. With
Quebec nationalism on the rise after a failed decade of attempted constitutional reform in the 1980s,
the sovereigntist Bloc Québécois and Parti Québécois political parties sought to take Quebec out of
the Canadian federation by hosting a referendum asking the infamous question: “Do you agree that
Quebec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic
and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the
agreement signed on June 12, 1995?” In response, the federal government of Canada organized
against the nationalist Yes Campaign, hoping to prevent a Québécois bid for independence. This
article outlines the four main strategies the federal government used to keep Quebec within the
federation: delegitimizing the question posed by the Parti Québécois on the referendum, turning
to the United States for support on Canadian unity, promising distinct society and constitutional
reforms for Quebec, and hosting an energetic Unity Rally in Montreal. With these four strategies, the
federal government of Canada would tried its best to organize against Quebec’s independence and
keep Canada whole.
Keywords: Jean Chrétien, Quebec, referendum, independence, Canada
The federal government of Canada faced a dire situation in October 1995 – the prospect
of the breakup of the Confederation with the withdrawal of the province of Quebec. For much of
Quebec’s independence campaign, the federal government ignored the simmering danger of a victory
for the Yes vote in the upcoming October 30, 1995 sovereignty referendum. Canadian federalists had
won decisively in the 1980 referendum with a 19.12% lead, and polls were showing that federalists
were once again in the lead during the beginning of the referendum campaign in 1995, polling ahead
by seven to eight points in early September.1 However, things soon took a turn for the worse for the
No campaign when support for sovereignty surged in popularity after Lucien Bouchard, leader of
the Bloc Québécois, became chief negotiator of the sovereignty movement in early October.2 This
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put federal government officials in a difficult situation, where they had to scramble to keep the
Yes vote from winning in order to preserve the Confederation. In response to the rising support
for sovereignty in Quebec, the Canadian government had to come up with various strategies in its
attempt to organize against a Yes vote and deter Quebec independence. During the final stretches
of the campaign, the federal government employed the following four strategies to win the vote:
delegitimizing the referendum question and the mandate for independence; seeking support from
the United States; recognizing Quebec as a distinct society and promising constitutional change;
and holding a Unity Rally in Montreal. With these last-minute strategies employed, the federal
government made its final bid to preserve Canada and keep Quebec within the Confederation.
When Jacques Parizeau, Premier of Quebec and leader of the separatist Parti Québécois,
unveiled the referendum question to the public on September 7, 1995, the federal government was
quick to delegitimize the referendum question in order to muddy the waters in its bid to prevent an
outcome that would lead to Quebec independence. The referendum question that was posed by the
Parti Québécois to the public read as follows: “Do you agree that Quebec should become sovereign
after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the
scope of the bill respecting the future of Quebec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”3
This was met with significant backlash from the No campaign – and specifically from the federal
government – because instead of a straightforward “yes or no” question, the federal government
argued that Jacques Parizeau was making the question intentionally confusing in order to try to gain
enough support for a Yes vote and drag Quebec out of the Confederation. Years later, in his memoir,
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien remarked that the question Parizeau presented was “even trickier
than the one Lévesque had presented in 1980.” 4 Shortly after the question was revealed, Chrétien
publicly railed against the referendum question, denouncing it in Parliament on September 18 as
a “trick question” and that “If [Jacques Parizeau]…was truly intellectually honest, he would have
asked Quebecers: Do you want to separate? And Quebecers would have answered: No, never.”5 Jean
Chrétien certainly had polls to support him on this point: an Angus Reid Group Poll from mid-
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October showed that a stunning 30% of Yes voters were only voting Yes in an attempt to strike a better
deal for Quebec within Canada – as opposed to voting Yes in order to obtain independence.6
Whether or not a Yes vote automatically meant a vote for independence was further put into
question by the fact that the Yes camp itself had internal splits. While Jacques Parizeau favored a path
to independence as fast as possible via a unilateral declaration of independence,7 the Bloc Québécois
leader Lucien Bouchard preferred separation between Quebec and the rest of Canada to follow a
more orderly negotiated process that would eventually result in a Quebec independent from Canada.
Bouchard wanted to maintain a tight bond with the rest of Canada, envisioning a Quebec that would
keep the Canadian dollar and maintain a customs union with its former country. This difference
in intentions is the reason that the question was made longer and more convoluted to begin with.8
Meanwhile, Mario Dumont, leader of the new provincial party, Action Démocratique du Québec, did
not advocate for independence right away. Rather, he joined the Yes coalition because he believed that
voting Yes would give Quebec the bargaining chips needed to secure more provincial power.9
Alongside Jean Chrétien, several other ministers in the federal government also criticized
the referendum question in an attempt to delegitimize it. Sheila Copps, Chrétien’s Deputy Prime
Minister, described the question 20 years later in an interview with Québécois journalist and political
pundit Chantal Hébert as “not as clear as it could have been,”10 which was putting it mildly. Brian
Tobin, federal Minister of Fisheries and Oceans, remarked in his memoir that the question had
“unfair wording…[the question] was a convoluted structure that managed to avoid using the word
‘separate.’”11 All of this anger about the clarity of the referendum question was key for the federal
government in its effort to organize against independence. Because of the public outrage over
the question, and the evidence that a sizeable portion of Quebecers planning to vote Yes did not
even want independence, the federal government had reasonable justification not to recognize a
slight majority Yes vote as a mandate for Quebec independence. Montreal Gazette journalist Irwin
Block alluded to this possibility early in October, writing in an article published on the 3rd that
“referendums do not automatically have the force of law on their side, and that a government can just
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ignore the results if they so choose.”12 It seems that the federal government left this strategy open as
part of its effort to keep the country together should the worst-case scenario – a Yes victory – arise.
Chrétien remarks in his memoir that “No matter what tricks Jacques Parizeau might have held up his
sleeve, the reality was that the crooked question had not asked for a mandate to separate”13 and that
it was “crazy to argue that one vote is enough to break up a nation.”14 Brian Tobin also weighed in on
the credibility of the mandate given how confusing the question was, saying “If you ask a mandate
for partnership and you do a [Unilateral Declaration of Independence], it’s a lie.”15 Chrétien’s foreign
affairs minister, André Ouellet, mentioned that he believed that the federal government would host a
second referendum with a clearer question in the event of a Yes victory.16 Even though Ouellet never
proposed this idea to Chrétien, it was clearly on the federal minister’s mind and may have come into
play in the event that the Yes side won on referendum night.
It is clear that part of the federal strategy to prevent Quebec’s independence was to
delegitimize the question in order to prevent a potential Yes outcome. With such a confusing question,
the federalists argued, how could anyone clearly say that Quebecers really voted for independence?
Given the internal split in the Yes camp between Jacques Parizeau, Lucien Bouchard, and Mario
Dumont over how to achieve independence, and whether independence or greater provincial power
was the aim, the federal government was able to effectively exploit the confusing referendum question
to argue that a 50+1 mandate was not enough for Quebec’s independence.
Receiving support from the United States was also critically important in the Canadian
federal government’s war-gaming strategy against Quebec independence. As per Jacques Parizeau’s
‘great game,’ in order to achieve Quebec independence, Quebec would need the recognition of the
United States as well as France. While the federal government had only so much it could do in regard
to France, given that its president Jacques Chirac was sympathetic to the movement for sovereignty,
there was a lot more help that could be obtained from President Bill Clinton in the United States,
whose position was pro-federalist on the Canadian matter. After a surge in polls in favor of the
sovereignty camp in mid-October,17 the federal government wasted no time in seeking American
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support in order to quell the nationalist fervor in Quebec.
The federal government naturally sought support from the highest place in the American
administration, the President’s office. According to James Blanchard, the U.S. Ambassador to Canada,
“Clinton was well-liked and well-respected in Quebec, with a favorability rating much higher than
Parizeau or Chrétien.”18 Since Bill Clinton was such a popular figure in Quebec, input from him was
deemed crucial for changing the minds of ‘soft nationalists’ who were not really sold on the idea of an
independent Quebec, but could still plan to vote Yes in order to gain more provincial powers. But the
path to receiving support from Bill Clinton came in gradual steps of cooperation with the Americans.
It is evident that Canada had federal agents working closely with the United States in order to
establish ways in which the U.S. could help the federalist cause. With separatists taking the lead in the
polls in mid-October, the federal government sought to work through Blanchard in order to convey a
message of unity, as well as to create the conditions necessary for these topics to come up and for the
two governments to work together. When Blanchard pitched the idea of making a public pro-unity
statement to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher on October 18, Blanchard said “Anything we
say that’s positive about Canada could help, because our polling shows that Quebeckers, including
French-speaking Quebeckers, value highly what Americans think… I’ve talked to the prime minister’s
people, and they agree.”19 One of these people was Eddie Goldenberg, a senior advisor to the Prime
Minister, with whom James Blanchard talked on the phone on October 17 regarding the referendum
issue. Thanks to this behind-the-scenes work, the Canadian government got its first victory when
Secretary Christopher publicly stated at a press conference that the U.S. placed a high value “...on
the relationships that we have with a strong and united Canada,” 20 after receiving a question from a
reporter on the topic.
The federal government saw to it that the level of support from the U.S. ballooned in the
days that followed. While attending the 50th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations at its
Headquarters in New York City on October 21 and 22, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and President
Bill Clinton encountered one another, and from this meeting Chrétien was able to directly seek U.S.
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assistance. In the 2005 CBC documentary film Breaking Point, it is mentioned that while at the United
Nations, “...Blanchard [had] set things up so that Jean Chrétien [and] Bill Clinton [would] casually
run into each other at the UN.”21 It was important for the Canadian government that this meeting
did not look like Chrétien was specifically meeting with Clinton in order to seek assistance, as that
would backfire against the federalists. However, while speaking to Clinton privately at a reception,
Chrétien explained the Quebec situation to the President. While Chrétien did not want to ask for help
overtly, it is evident that a request for aid is what he was insinuating. From this conversation, in which
Chrétien bemoaned the difficulties of the campaign, Chrétien successfully lured the President into
offering assistance. According to Chrétien, the President said “You know what Jean… it would be a
terrible tragedy for the world if a country like Canada were to disappear. Do you think it would help
if I said something?”22
With Clinton on board to help, the Canadian federal government merely needed a platform
for Clinton and the U.S. administration to express their appeal for a united Canada. In order to
give the U.S. administration such a platform, the federal government decided to plant sympathetic
reporters at important U.S. press conferences. These reporters were to ask American officials
questions regarding the referendum in order to encourage a reassuring response in favor of unity
from the United States. On October 25, U.S. Press Secretary Mike McCurry gave a statement in
support of Canadian unity in response to a “planted question about the referendum…”23 as planned.
The statement was very similar to that of Warren Christopher’s, stressing that the question was for
Quebecers to decide, however, the U.S. position was that a strong and united Canada was a great
ally. Mike McCurry concluded by mentioning that Bill Clinton had a news conference later that day,
alluding that he would be open to being asked.24
Bill Clinton, of course, was completely prepared for the question. He had extended his hand
to the Prime Minister at the United Nations, and now he was due to deliver. Jean Chrétien describes
in his memoir that the question Bill Clinton answered about the referendum “had been planted with
a Canadian reporter at a televised press conference in Washington.”25 As planned, the reporter asked
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Clinton, “Are you concerned about the possible break up of Canada, and the impact that could have
on the North American economy and Canada-U.S. trade relations?,” to which the President answered
by stating:
This vote is a Canadian internal issue for the Canadian people to decide, and I
would not presume to interfere with that. I can tell you that a strong and united
Canada has been a wonderful partner for the United States and an incredibly
important and constructive citizen throughout the entire world…I’ve seen how
our partnership works, how the leadership of Canada in so many ways throughout
the world works, and what it means to the rest of the world to think that there’s a
country like Canada where things basically work.26
A statement in support of Canada was exactly what the Canadian government wanted.
The statement was diplomatically tactful; the U.S. President did not say he was against Quebec
independence, rather, he merely stated that he appreciated a strong and united Canada. It is without
a doubt that the Canadian government sought out a statement in favor of federalism from Bill
Clinton because of his popularity in Quebec, and what that might mean for the swing vote. Raymond
Chrétien, the Canadian ambassador to the United States (and nephew of Jean Chrétien), said in an
interview with the prolific journalist Chantal Hébert that “Clinton was very popular in Quebec and
some analysts credit his intervention for having moved a few percentage points of support back to
the No camp.”27
Whether or not Bill Clinton’s statement had the massive effect described by Raymond
Chrétien cannot be determined for certain. In any case, the statement was at least effective in denying
Jacques Parizeau his wish to see the U.S. recognize an independent Quebec. The statement was also
helpful in allowing the United States to gently demonstrate its support for Canadian unity. Overall,
through their intimate work with U.S. officials in order to craft statements in favor of Canadian unity,
it is clear that the Canadian government saw gaining support from the United States as pivotal to its
war-gaming strategy, especially since Bill Clinton was popular in Quebec, and many Quebecers cared
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about what Americans thought about them and their situation.
In order to properly organize against independence, however, the federal government needed
to do more than seek support from without – they also needed to seek support from within. Now, the
federal war-gaming strategy turned toward appealing to the identity of Quebecers by recognizing
Quebec as a distinct society and by promising constitutional change. This concession came at the
last minute against the backdrop of surging support for the Yes campaign. As polls kept showing the
federalists behind, it became clear to federal strategists that they had to change course if they wanted
to keep the Confederation together.
Until this point, the federal government had distanced itself from embracing Quebec as a
distinct society. This had potential to open a constitutional can of worms that Chrétien wanted to
avoid. However, the government had to change course on October 21 after Daniel Johnson Jr., the
provincial Quebec Liberal leader, publicly requested that Chrétien endorse Quebec’s distinct society
status, as well as promise constitutional reform. Chrétien, who was in New York at the time, rejected
this proposal, saying “There is no desire at this time to debate the constitution. For the next eight days
we’re concentrating on the cause of keeping Canada together.”28 Soon afterward, Johnson rescinded
his statement.29 This gaffe was taken advantage of by the separatists, as Lucien Bouchard rushed to
invite Johnson over to the Yes campaign, because the federal government said “no” to Johnson, just as
it had always said “no” to Quebec in the past.30
The federal government rapidly moved to turn this mistake around. On Sunday, October 22,
the day after Chrétien’s rash choice of words, Chrétien and Johnson issued a joint statement saying
“We state without equivocation that Quebec is a distinct society…We note that both of us supported
the inclusion of this principle in the Canadian Constitution every time Quebec asked for it.”31 This
marked the first time in the campaign when Chrétien explicitly came out in support of the notion
of a distinct society. The following day, Chrétien came back to Canada from New York ready to fight
in order to keep the country together at any cost. In his memoir, Chrétien states that “At last I was
going to act on my basic instincts and plunge into the campaign…It was time to speak to the hearts of
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Quebecers rather than to their wallets; time to make the 20 percent of soft federalists and undecideds
wake up to the fact that Canada was at risk.”32 To push these swing voters into the federalist camp,
however, the government had to work hard to drive home the point that they would support Quebec
as a distinct society and promise constitutional reform.
Chrétien and his team wasted no time preparing a more public platform to support their new
vision. On October 23, the Prime Minister worked with his advisors Eddie Goldenberg and Patrick
Parisot to draft the speech that Chrétien would give the next day at a rally in the Verdun Auditorium
in suburban Montreal. In his speech to an audience of more than 12,000 supporters, Chrétien boldly
proclaimed that “[Quebecers] want to see Quebec recognized as a distinct society within Canada by
virtue of its language, culture and institutions…I’ve said it before and I’ll say it again: I agree. I have
supported that position in the past, I support it today, and I will support it in the future, whatever the
circumstances.” Chrétien also opened the door for constitutional reform, stating “We will be keeping
open all the other paths for change, including the administrative and constitutional paths. Any
changes in constitutional jurisdiction for Quebec will be made only with the consent of Quebecers.”33
The climax of this appeal to the notion of Quebec as a distinct society and a promise for
constitutional change came in the form of Chrétien’s first-ever televised address to the nation on
October 25, just five days before the referendum. In this speech, broadcast in English and in French,
Chrétien made it clear that “We must recognize that Quebec’s language, its culture and institutions
make it a distinct society. And no constitutional change that affects the powers of Quebec should
ever be made without the consent of Quebecers.” To cement his point, he added, “And that all
governments – federal and provincial – must respond to the desire of Canadians – everywhere –
for greater decentralization.”34
After the patriation of the constitution in 1982, Quebec was set adrift from the rest of Canada,
as the Quebec government never consented to the 1982 Constitution Act. Attempts to bring Quebec
into the constitutional fold, such as the 1987 Meech Lake Accord and the 1992 Charlottetown Accord,
all failed to deliver, and the failure of these accords meant the failure to recognize Quebec as a distinct
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society. This was much to the chagrin of many Quebecers and Quebecer politicians, and had led
many of them to break away and create the sovereigntist Bloc Québécois political party, a federal
counterpart to the provincial Parti Québécois. Therefore, for the federal government in 1995, it
became critical to appeal to Quebecers on this front, as the constitutional wars of the 1980s and their
inability to satisfactorily address Quebec as a distinct society were what had led to the resurgence in
Quebec nationalism and separatism.
The U-turn in policy mid-campaign to publicly acknowledge Quebec as a distinct society
and promise constitutional change was part of federal strategy to appeal to soft nationalists in
Quebec and other swing voters. Whether or not Chrétien meant what he said or even liked what
he said did not matter for the federal strategy – all that mattered for the federal strategists was that
they could gain more votes by promising that change would happen. Jean Charest, one of only two
federal Conservatives from Quebec in Parliament at the time, said that “Everyone knew that it did
not come from the heart, that it was a move dictated by the difficult circumstances of the campaign.”35
Regardless, the federal government still employed this strategy as a last-ditch way to scrape together
enough votes to succeed. After the referendum, Chrétien moved to have Parliament recognize
Quebec as a distinct society, as well as give Quebec, among other provinces and regions, veto power
over constitutional affairs.36 This was to make good on his promises made during the referendum
campaign. Although the plan mostly fizzled out in the end, the federal government had received what
it wanted by then – a No vote guaranteeing that Quebec would remain within the Confederation. In
December 1995, the federal government went on to half-heartedly stay true to its word by passing a
House of Commons resolution that recognized Quebec as a distinct society.37
In a final grand gesture to keep Quebec within the Confederation, the federal government
organized against independence by arranging a rally in Montreal. This event, which would become
known as the Unity Rally, was meant to make Canada highly visible within Quebec as well as to try to
show Quebecers that people from the rest of Canada cared about the province and would be upset to
see them go. It was hoped that this emotional plea from the rest of Canada would be enough to sway
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some swing voters in the direction of federalism. Whether or not this worked, in order to preserve the
country, the strategy of the federal government was to make Canada more visible within Quebec.
The Rally, which took place three days before the referendum, on October 27, started out as
the pet project of federal minister Brian Tobin, the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans. Fed up with
attending typical government meetings with other ministers as the breakup of the country seemed
imminent, Tobin changed the course of his meeting with other ministers on October 23 by deciding
to scrap the typical agenda of working out policy issues in favor of trying to do something that could
help preserve the country.38 Turning to his deputy minister, Bill Rowat, and executive assistant, Gary
Anstey, Tobin said of the situation: “Here we are facing the very least a possible constitutional crisis
in a week’s time, and we’re behaving as though everything were normal. And it’s not.”39 From this
meeting, Tobin and his team decided to hijack another existing rally in Montreal – a rally originally
organized by businessmen in the city set to take place on Friday October 27 at the Place du Canada –
and build on that event by turning it into a rally for the cause of Canadian unity.40
Tobin wanted to get as many people to the Unity Rally as possible in order to send a message
loud and clear – that Canada loved Quebec and did not want separation. Tobin started small in his
plans to increase attendance, but soon organized a federal effort through his contacts in order to get
more people to the rally from all across Canada, as well as to have important federal and provincial
figures attend the rally to further boost the visibility of Canada in Quebec. At first, Tobin gave his
entire ministry the day off on October 27 so that they could attend the rally and ideally bring their
families. Tobin soon got other ministers on board in shutting down their ministries for the day, so
as to allow their employees to also attend the Unity Rally.41 Just including government employees
was not enough to make attendance massive, however, so Tobin sought to bring average citizens
from across Canada to Montreal in order to send a special message to Quebec. “Only one message, it
seemed to me, could be effectively conveyed to Quebec by the rest of Canada in the time available,”
Tobin stated in his memoir. “That message would be we care.”42
With the rally only four days away from when Tobin began his planning, the federal minister
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needed to find a way to make the rally attractive enough for people from the rest of the country to
attend on such short notice. Tobin therefore worked with his various connections in order to make
it happen. Tobin’s solution was simple: lower the price of transportation to Montreal to get as many
people to attend as possible. He began by calling Premier Frank McKenna of New Brunswick in an
attempt to enlist him in this project. McKenna agreed to the scheme, saying to Tobin, “Tell me when
and where, and I’ll bring as many New Brunswickers as I can.”43 Tobin then turned his attention
to the federal minister of employment and immigration, Lloyd Axworthy, to see if he could bring
people from Manitoba to Montreal by plane, and he called officials in Vancouver asking the same
thing, to which they all agreed. Tobin spent the entirety of October 23 working non-stop in order to
arrange the transportation needed to get as many people to Montreal as possible, saying “I repeated
the process all across Canada. I called senators, cabinet ministers, MPs, premiers, anyone I know
who shared my concerns about who would agree to take action.”44 Tobin’s requests for help were not
entirely limited to the governmental sphere, however. In order to ensure the Unity Rally would have
a high attendance, Tobin also turned to the private sphere. After reaching out to Air Canada and
Canadian Airlines, the companies agreed to provide the planes necessary to transport people from all
across Canada to Montreal in order to make it to the Unity Rally. Canadian Airlines even announced
a “unity rate” which slashed the price of tickets to Montreal on October 27 up to 90% in order to entice
people to attend.45
One problem with this scheme was that it had not yet gained official assent – Chrétien knew
nothing of the project until the next day on October 24. However, when the plan was brought up to
Chrétien that day, he soon approved of it, and Tobin and other federal ministers worked tirelessly to
organize the transportation necessary to build up the rally’s attendance.46 The Unity Rally was now
properly in the federal war-gaming strategy camp, with Jean Chrétien himself planning to be there
to intensify the visibility and presence of Canada within Quebec and contribute to the statement that
the rest of the country cared about the province. With increasing federal influence, more companies
lined up to join the scheme to get as many Canadians as possible to Montreal on October 27. This is
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evidenced by VIA Rail, as well as multiple bus companies, which also began offering reduced rates
to Montreal like their airline counterparts.47 With the intense support received from the Canadian
business world, the federal government was able to orchestrate a huge success in getting people to
attend the rally. The Ottawa Citizen noted on October 27 that “By noon, almost all 1,000 seats for
the 6:55 and 10 a.m. VIA rail trains to Montreal had been sold. A 60-per-cent discount on the tickets
helped the seats sell quickly.”48 In the end, the federal government was able to come up with enough
support to turn what Brian Tobin initially thought would be a rally attended by only a few thousand
people into a rally, as some estimates had it, was attended by more than 100,000 people.49 Waving
Canadian and Quebec flags, holding posters to demonstrate their love for Quebec, and attending
political speeches from important federal ministers,50 Canadian citizens swarmed Montreal to show
their love for Canada and plead for Quebec to remain within the Confederation – just as the federal
government wanted. Case in point: one joyful Canadian citizen on the streets of Montreal that day
enthusiastically said to a reporter “I just love Quebec! We spent a lot of time during the first couple
of years that we were here and we just love the people, we love the joie de vivre…and I’d really want
to maintain that French without [being] outside of Canada.”51 Another citizen, when asked if they
thought that rally would make any difference on the outcome of referendum, responded “I would
certainly hope that it would make a difference…it’s certainly very important to everyone in the rest
of the country and I’m sure glad to see everyone here.”52
Important federal personnel also took the rally as an opportunity to score some points with
Quebec voters while they were there. Jean Chrétien, in a speech to federalist supporters at the Place
du Canada, declared that “We will do what is needed, we will make the changes that are needed…so
that at the beginning of the next century Canada will move in the 21st century united from sea to sea
proud of its two official languages!”53 This, of course, was to appeal to the earlier concession which
had promised Quebec the status of a distinct society as well as constitutional reform. The message
that the federal government orchestrated was loud and clear: “Canadians love Quebec, and they
don’t want to see Quebec leave – please stay. We will do anything to keep you in the Confederation.”
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Whether or not the Unity Rally was actually effective is another matter – there is great debate
about that to this day, and even the people involved in orchestrating it have their doubts. “…[A]t
the very least,” Tobin believed, “[the rally] heartened those who were fighting for the federalist side
within Quebec and assured them that Canadians outside Quebec were not indifferent to their fate.”54
Chrétien, meanwhile, believed that the rally gave Quebecers the “opportunity to take a moment to
reflect about the possibility of losing Canada.”55 Regardless of effectiveness, the federal government
organized the Unity Rally because they believed it would be strategically useful in “war-gaming”
against Quebec independence. The rally brought energy, hope, and pleas for a united Canada, and
the federal government hoped it would be enough to keep the country together.
The federal effort to organize against independence died down after the emotional climax
of the Unity Rally. The end result was a vote to remain within the Confederation – the No vote barely
beat the Yes vote by 50.58% to 49.42%, a difference of about 54,000 votes out of over 4.7 million
total ballots cast.56 The effectiveness of any given strategy that the federal government employed is
debatable. However, it is clear that the federal government had certain strategies in place to organize
against Quebec independence and keep the country from fracturing into two. By delegitimizing the
question that the Parti Québécois posed to the voters of Quebec, the federal government was able
to delegitimize the mandate required for secession, which would give it room to maneuver in the
event of a slim Yes victory. The federal government was also able to turn to its ally – the United States
– to gain support for the cause of unity, as well as deny Jacques Parizeau his goal of having the U.S.
recognize an independent Quebec. In an appeal to Quebecers themselves, the federal government
promised the province its desired status as a distinct society, and also promised constitutional
reform in favor of Quebec so as to make up for past grievances. And in one final push towards victory
for the No campaign, the federal government organized and held an energetic rally for unity in
Montreal in order to appeal to the sympathies of Quebecers and demonstrate nationwide support
for the province remaining a part of Canada. The Canadian federal government employed these
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four strategies in combination to fight against the independence of Quebec and preserve the unity
of the Canadian federation.

Juan Morales is a senior at Bridgewater State University,
and takes interest in events in world history.
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